When you live in country where censorship is the norm … the Internet is your only communications mechanism.” – Eric Schmidt, Executive Chairman of Google, after visiting Libya in January 2012

First, some history. Censorship of the Internet, among other factors, has long hindered growth of technology in Libya. Perhaps nothing limited ICT advancement more than when Libya Telecom & Technology (LTT), under the direction of Gadhafi’s government, shut-down the local Internet for over five months last year in an attempt to suppress the rebel movement.

Libya undeniably has better fixed and mobile infrastructure than most African nations. Despite one Internet service provider and only two mobile operators (nine telecoms operators in total), Libya boasts high Internet and mobile access rates (15% Internet penetration rate and a staggering 201% mobile penetration rate!)

In recent months, however, power outages have plagued reliable Internet connectivity. Plus, infrastructure – especially cellular and WiMax – was damaged in the recent civil war. Sentiment from the ground (via Twitter & Twitter, for example) indicates frustration with the level of services. TechnoLibya has reported issues with LTT WiMAX speed and coverage, but experiences stable connections with ADSL.

Libya is looking to Egypt to form ICT policy and regulations:

• In January 2012, Egypt and Libya discussed working together to strengthen Libya’s ICT environment. Ministers from both nations exchanged ideas on creating a regulatory framework. More importantly, officials talked of the importance of empowering the people with tech skills. We wouldn’t be surprised if Libya’s regulatory body and processes mirror those found in Egypt. After all, Egypt, like Libya, does not have clean slate when it comes to Internet censorship. Therein lies the opportunity of this relationship.

The e-Libya initiative will strengthen key areas of government, education, and the economy:

• The majority of the Libyan workforce has heretofore been employed in the public sector. A drastic privatization of the telecoms companies would be ineffective. Fortunately, the e-Libya initiative aims to create an open and transparent government, strengthen e-commerce, and establish a higher level of e-learning. The construction of a strong SME culture is essential for Libya to grow economic stability.

How effective will the interim government be?

• Business Monitor International, a telecoms intelligence firm, is less optimistic about Libya’s future. Their analysis questions the interim government’s ability to reform Libyan policy. Like Khaled el Mufti, the man in charge of e-Libya, BMI is skeptical that Libya is ready for a free telecoms sector.
• Plus, economic factors like inflation, unemployment, and a sharp decline in foreign investment must be overcome. A strong business environment needs to be rebuilt.

Click to enlarge. {Libya Telecom & Technology}

Often, the death of one leader means a clean slate for the nation (just look at how far Rwanda has come economically since Paul Kagame became president.) At least for now, there is a glimmer of hope that the future president’s initiatives will emphasize business development, technology incubation, and skills training. Unfortunately, 2+ years of relative stability did little to improve Guinea-Bissau’s infrastructure and ICT policies.

The future appears complex. Some observers fear that the political struggle may lead to a major destabilization. Destabilization that would historically benefit the military. Destabilization that has more-or-less defined Guinea-Bissau’s independence. National Assembly President Raimundo Pereira is currently the acting president until elections can be held by early April 2012, but he won’t get a chance to do accomplish more than the prevention of civil unrest. There certainly won’t be any push for, say, a national ICT policy during Pereira’s tenure.

Even during the period of relatively stability during President Sanha’s rule (2009-2012) there were few efforts to create an information society. Former presidents Kumba Ialá and João Bernardo Vieira did little other than to partially privatize the telecoms sector.

Internet statistics are scarce. The latest ITU numbers – from 2009 – cited a stagnant 2.3-2.5% Internet penetration rate in Guinea-Bissau:

Internet users (per 100 people) in Guinea Bissau - World Bank (ITU). Notice the plateau around 2008. {Trading Economics}

Surely the availability has increased two-and-a-half years later with the proliferation of mobile devices, but it’s hard to say where it could stand. Facebook doesn’t even provide public user data for Guinea-Bissau (nor does it for Liberia, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Western Sahara). For one, the development of internet services is still limited by the country’s lack of electricity. Few areas, even in Bissau, receive power at all hours of the day. 3G is not yet available, either.

Even though mobile penetration is surely greater than 60% (it was 32% a couple of years ago) mobile operators don’t seem to be running on all cylinders:

• MTN Bissau’s site seemingly hasn’t been updated since 2010. A Twitter account has been inactive since 2009.
• Sonatel increased market share throughout 2011. The telecom operator has 90% ownership of mobile operator Orange Guinea. Unfortunately, Orange Guineas’s activities page was last updated in December 2010. Still in 2009 there were an estimated 118,000 mobile subscribers in the country – nearly twice as many than one year prior.
• Guinea Telecom and Guinetel (both bankrupt) are to be completely privatized soon. (The telecommunications sector was deregulated nearly ten years ago)
• In terms of broadband, 75% of Internet subscribers are through Orange who claimed 928 broadband subscribers at the end of 2009.
• A telecommunications law exists from 1999 that stipulates the need to create competitive conditions, seeks to lower access costs, and promises to increase telecoms coverage. A national ICT policy has never been discussed, although the UN attempted to assist in the formulation process years ago. Ten years later, the country was still in a stage of raising awareness.

The good news? Starting a business in Guinea-Bissau is easier than ever. The World Bank Group writes that the time to start a business has dropped from 216 days to 9 days.

Still, the nation needs broadband connectivity if online businesses, incubators, and e-services are to flourish. The fact that fewer than 2,000 broadband subscriptions existed as of 2009 is troubling. Perhaps even more daunting is the fact that no undersea cable is slated to connect to Guinea-Bissau. ACE and WACS will both bypass the coastal nation. The next leader will sorely need to invest in terrestrial fiber, 3G infrastructure, and above all, electricity.

We’ll watch closely as elections near in April 2012 to see how Bissauans utilize social media during the electoral process. Perhaps the event will encourage online participation in debate, discussion, and the overall creation of local content.

A general idea of where terrorist activity is the greatest threat across Africa (excluding Somalia), although online terrorists can presumably capture followers from any nation. {GlobalSecurity.org}

Of late, the world has turned its eyes on terrorism in Africa. However, most attention has been on Somalia. Somalia certainly stands out in terms of media coverage – and rightfully so. The Islamist extremist group al-Shabaab is now a household name after causing mass casualties in Mogadishu (among other cities) and contributed to epic famine in the Horn of Africa. The lack of a stable government – a direct cause of al-Shabaab’s activity – has contributed to a lawless state, which in turn has contributed to another form of terrorism – piracy on the open seas.

Many individuals don’t realize African terrorists have Internet service and actively use the Internet. Although Somalia hardly had an Internet connection at the turn of the millennium, stated Internet penetration is now around the 1.1% mark (ITU June 2010), with Facebook penetration conservatively estimated at 0.35%. Of course, the number of Internet users is difficult to track as many use proxy IPs and most connections are not private. Fewer than 100 domains are registered to Somalia, but again, this statistic only speaks to a lack of content on Somali-owned sites and not a lack of content by Somalis. Similar trends ring true for Mauritania and most other nations occupying the Sahel.

Despite a general lack of Internet access in these remote, and often landlocked areas, terrorists have found the means to gain support and claim new followers in online forums. The nations of interior Africa, notably Mauritania and Mali, are known to house significant terrorist factions. Border protection is difficult in remote areas, but Internet protection has proven to be just as difficult. A lack of Internet laws and emphasis on positive tech applications are allowing the terror threat to grow.

Mauritania:

In 2012, the ACE cable will bring Mauritania its first true global broadband services. However, the nation’s Internet laws are not at all ready for the phenomenon. A July 2011 article on Magharebia.com, titled “Jihadist websites tempt Mauritanian boys” sounds foreboding. The article describes how youth in Nouakchott are increasingly turning to Internet cafes to pass the time. The fear is that impressionable and pessimistic youth will lock on to enticing new media promoting extremist views. Cafe owners cannot be relied upon to monitor web habits. Instead, it will take government action to keep the nation safe. Blocking social networks is not the solution, but perhaps limiting certain sites could be viable.

A September 2011 article explains the lack of government ability to ban websites, although the tech capacity certainly exists. Terrorists apparently are using YouTube, but a fine line exists between banning the service completely and filtering its content. Either way, an Internet cafe owner explains how he lost customers after advising them to stop visiting jihadist websites.

Morocco:

Mali’s security services claim al-Qaeda has plans to strengthen its network in Morocco. Last month, three members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) were arrested. One of the men was an active individual on jihadist Internet sites with links to the al-Qaeda network. A similar dismantling occurred in December 2010. At that time, Morocco devoted a team of experts to pursue terrorist groups operating via the Internet. One analyst called the Internet “a school for terrorists” and pointed out how the web can convey radical messages and also train terorrists to carry-out attacks.

The nation is very aware of terrorists’ intentions to destabilize the region, but policing the eastern and southern borders remains difficult. Hopefully, online monitoring efforts can counter the physical challenges of watching AQIM operatives.

Nigeria:

Boko Haram has been bombing parts of northern Nigeria since 2009. No word on how active the group is online.

Chad, Niger, Mali, Algeria, Libya:

Little definite information readily available on how terrorists are harnessing online means.

A series of hierarchies could ameliorate the terrorist threat in Africa. Under this model, parents would monitor their children, cyber cafe owners would monitor patrons, and ISPs/government would filter the most extreme online activity and promote safe web habits. In more detail:

• Teenagers must be steered in the right direction. Gale Ngakane, correspondent for Botswana’s The Monitor, sums up the sentiment best when she warns, “With Internet access easily available to children at home, school and from Internet cafes, you can never really know what your child is up to. The scenario in Mauritania sounds exactly like many urban areas in the United States. For example, one effective way to curb gang activity is to offer after-school programs for youth. Why can’t at-risk African nations seek funding for tech competitions?
• Governments must block known terrorist websites. Yes, this is blatant censorship, but not all web filtering should be treated equally. A proven life-or-death situation is different than simply attempting to prevent dissent. Social networks should not be entirely blocked, however, which poses a major challenge as terrorist groups begin to rely more on social media and perhaps less on traditional bulletin boards. At-risk nations can consult with other governments and security forces before enforcing any kind of blockage. Additionally, governments should consider public campaigns to raise awareness of the harms of jihadist actions.
• Cyber cafe owners need to be vigilant and choose patriotism over profits. Currently, if an owner denies service to a militant youth, the youth can find Internet access elsewhere. However, if all Internet cafe owners agree to enforce safe web browsing, then the youth will have no choice but to see a private access point.

For now, home access remains extremely limited across the Sahel, as does mobile broadband. However, the arrival of true broadband for Mauritania, Chad, and Niger in 2012 is sure to encourage lower access costs, and therefore, encourage more private Internet use. Dangerous, especially when coupled with streaming video. Now is the chance to foster safe Internet habits. It’s not worth the risk to wait until another attack.

I am happy to say that we have at our disposal a technology of which our forefathers could only dream; a technology which can transform local happenings into global events. That is the technology of telecommunications.” – Yoshio Utsumi, former Secretary-General, ITU

In February 2000, delegates from across the globe (and Africa) met in Bamako, Mali for intensive dialogue on the promotion, use, and appropriation of information and communication technology. Present were public officials, businessmen, academics, women, youth, and everyone else in-between. Based on an analysis of high-level global ICT trends from 1996-2000, the conference recommended having civil society, public authorities, enterprises, and organizations throughout the world to join in the endeavor to implement the rather involved Plan of Action. Although the primary goal of the gathering was to continue building bridges to development established four years prior, the African setting was used to stress the importance of regional advancement. After all, alliances, be they global, regional, national, private, or public, are necessary for individual nations to experience optimal telecoms growth and functionality.

Geekcorps computer training class, Bamako, Mali.{Wikimedia via Robin Taylor}

Speeches:

Few first-hand accounts or transcriptions of the events’ sessions are found, but notes on speech by Aminata Traoré, former Malian Minister of Culture and Tourism shed light on the seriousness of event. Madame Traoré reminds us that ICTs are not mere supports for politics or social progress. In short, she suggests that technology and socio-political change are two separate revolutions. With great concern, Mme. Traoré goes on to question the educational significance of the Internet. That is, will the Internet lead to a boost in capacity-building and decision-making or will it contribute to cultural alienation? Finally, she warns not to blame developmental failures on politicians. Instead, failures are tied to global interactions that Africa must challenge.

The speech seems to have raised more questions that it answered, notably:

• Will Africa harness the power of the Internet to become more independent?
• How will ICTs be used?
• Will the Internet clarify benchmarks in schooling or only make them worse?
• Will Africans grow to see the Internet like they have the television?

Yoshio Utsumi, Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union touches upon the characteristics of the telecommunications revolution. He specifically notes the growing support for the abolishment of monopolies, the growth of mobile phones, and the construction of voice, data, and video networks. Mr. Utsumi’s explanation of how telecoms privatization increases competition and decreases end-user costs is especially succinct: “The recipe involves four main ingredients: competition, private sector participation, independent regulation and the use of the newest technologies.” Mr. Utsumi, unlike Mme. Traoré, stresses the need for government to encourage the development process through new regulatory framework and changes to the business environment.

Results:

Immediate results of the conference are easier to quantify than long-term benefits. Cameroon, for example, used the event as an impetus to re-visit a national ICT plan. Host nation Mali also had an ICT plan enacted shortly after the conference. Senegal, in turn, used the conference to partially shape its national plan. Long-term goals, all still very meaningful for 2011, are summarized below.

ICTs should:

• require international cooperation
• depend on domestic resources
• be accessible to all nations
• enhance relations among people
• provide identity to isolated areas
• contribute to societal change

10 Benchmark Principles:

1. universal access to information
2. right to freedom of expression
3. reduction of ICT regulatory obstacles
4. improvement of monetary policy to increase access
5. local content development
6. defined roles for state and private sector (state creates positive environment, private acts as driving force)
7. simplify forms of partnership
8. better human networking to increase knowledge
9. human capacity building
10. democratic debate

• encouraging competition by reducing regulatory demands
• wireless service roll-out is aided by spectrum frequency policies
• government support for national backbone construction
• taking steps to reduce investment costs for the operator(s)

To raise citizen awareness about the benefits broadband can provide, consider:

• digital literacy promotion
• the distribution of low-cost devices and terminals
• having government serve as an anchor tenant
• developing local online content
• incentives for businesses to adopt broadband (and ideally e-commerce)
• customized policies to grow demand

These ideas are hardly novel concepts, but it never hurts to reinforce the roles of government and stakeholders.

Source: Yongsoo Kim, Tim Kelly, and Siddhartha Raja. Building Broadband: Strategies and Policies for the Developing World, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2010. Accessed 15 June 2011. http://books.google.com/books?id=_ew13Y7w0FQC.

{AFTLD.org}

The presentation of a 5-year strategic plan outlined challenges facing ccTLDs:

• Many AF ccTLDs are not technically up and doing
• Some AF ccTLD still operated from outside continent technically
• Many AF ccTLD operate in non-sustainable basis
• Many AF ccTLD not visible within Society and outside

Additionally, Tweets from the two days have been broadcast thanks to Joe Kiragu’s (@joekirags) use of the #AfTLD hashtag. oAfrica comments are in bold:

• Africa enjoying significant growth on internet access, this is not the case with ccTLD growth lack of interest in local content…presumably an interest in Facebook instead
• .co.za has over 650,000 domain names (African Registry Consortium) well ahead of other African nations
• .so domains at 25,000 mark, most of them registered international in Asia as opposed to Somali anyone can register a .so domain…does .so count as truly African? should it be restricted?
• In less that few month .So (Somali) has grown to be the second biggest ccTLD in Africa doesn’t mean much considering how it’s regulated
• .tz domain names at 4,000 mark – tzNIC
• Internet usage in Africa at 14.8% while the rest of the world is at 85.2%.lags behind Africa -  MainOne sponsor stat is higher than 10.9% ITU June 2010, but seems fair
• There are more exchange points in East Africa than West Africa – Michuuki Mwangi

ICT and philosophy go hand-in-hand

Wim van Binsbergen, the guru of enculturation of ICT in Africa, has written at-length on how Africa has responded, is responding, and will respond to electronic forms of ICT. In his works we can find the voices of various African philosophers including Mazrui from Kenya, Gyekye of Ghana, :

• Ali Mazrui (Kenya) in 1978 regarded the computer as a ‘cultural transplant’ from the North, alien to the societies and cultures of Africa and only capable of having a devastating or subjugating effect in the African context. Historian Bennetta Jules-Rosette summarized Mazrui’s view in the following terms:

[the] imported nature [of the computer] might badly fit the tasks and orientation of non-western workers, and as a result it may form a source of socio-cultural disruption, increasing economic dependency and introducing modes of thought which are alien to the working environment in which the computer is being used.

• Kwame Gyekye (Ghana) agreed with this view in 1997 when he said:

Ideally, technology, as a cultural product, should rise from the culture of a people, if it is to be directly accessible to a large section of the population and its nuances are to be fully appreciated by them.

• Paulin Hountondji (Côte d’Ivoire) did not attempt to claim a distinct African identity and culture. He wishes to recognize the fact that contemporary African expressions are increasingly linked up with a global cultural, philosophical and technological mainstream. He felt ICT was the answer to Africa’s lagging behind in knowledge production, and planned an institute that would rely on electronic ICT instead of more traditional African means.

Today, the issue of ICT and identity commonly becomes manifest in business investment decisions (how much foreign involvement is necessary to stimulate growth) and the emphasis on local African content for Africa. The consensus now is that the computer and its consequences can be tailored to fit within the paradigm of existing African culture. Just look at e-agriculture and crowd sourcing platforms. Plus, the popularity of the mobile phone and cyber café over the private household desktop computer is further testament to the fact that African cultures can maintain social identity in the computer age.

Source: “Can ICT belong in Africa, or is ICT owned by the North Atlantic region?“, in: Van Binsbergen, W.M.J. & Rijk van Dijk, in press, eds., ‘Situating globality: African Agency in the Appropriation of Global Culture, ASC Yearbook 2003, Brill: Leiden, 111-112.

Careful planning leads African nations in the proper direction

The successful implementation of a national ICT (NICT) plan, also known as national information and communication infrastructure (NICI) plan,  requires a great deal of planning on the part of the government. National ICT plans face an array of challenges including costs, stubborn government leaders, lack of infrastructure (ie. electricity), and a limited number of trained consultants. The initial process of deciding to create a plan, researching the best options for a plan, collaborating with experts and leaders, and approving the plan often takes years in itself. At that time, the country is perhaps in a different social and economic state. Plus, the government may or may not have seen drastic shifts in power. Additionally, if a plan is enacted, it can lose government support, face corruption, or lack adequate funding. For example, an article by Sylvester Ngoma describes the challenges faced in the Congo.

During the 1999-2006 period, most nations either had a plan or were in the early stages of developing an ICT plan. In 2000, thirteen countries had NICI policies and plans while ten countries were in the process of designing NICI policies and plans. To see the plans of African nations between 1999 and 2006, head over to the NICI Country Pages created by the Economic Commission for Africa – once home to the most up-to-date information on Africa’s dynamic NICI scene. For historical documents and other secondary sources, browse the vast amount of information at the ICT Observatory. A UNECA PowerPoint showing the NICI status of each African country is available as well.

National ICT plan progress, 2000-2004. Note the 56% increase in # of countries with finalized policy between 2002 and 2004. Click to enlarge. {UNECA}

Years later, however, the number of African nation with active ICT plans remains much the same as it did in 2004. Many nations still do not have an official government-approved plan. Other countries have seen success, but the status of their NICT plan remains difficult to pinpoint. Moreover, many of the nations that once had active national plans have failed to update, re-evaluate, or re-emphasize their plans. A plan that functioned in 1999 will not necessarily yield the same results in 2011 due to the changing technological landscape (think social media, mobile, and broadband). Accordingly, a nation with an ICT plan is not necessarily a nation with an active ICT plan.

Below you will find a list of African nations with relatively current and well-publicized ICT plans. Plans that are known to be current within the past 3 years have the greatest chance at still being effective. Although 42 nations technically have national ICT plans, fewer have modern ones. 6 countries have not yet initiated the process in the formulation of ICT policies include Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya Arab Jamahiriya, Sao Tome and Principe and Somalia.

Angola:

• Strategy for The Development of Information technology 2000-2010
• Status unsure
• http://www.uneca.org/aisi/nici/Angola/angola.htm

Benin:

• National Vision for 2025
• National ICT plan, 2000-2004, goal to make socio-economic progress
• http://www.observatoiretic.org/documents/show/17

Burkina Faso:

• Council of Ministers approved a plan lasting from 2000 through 2004, and another plan through 2006
• http://www.observatoiretic.org/documents/show/161

Botswana:

• National: 2007-2016, grow the ICT industry, make Botswana a regional ICT hub, 6-step plan: e-government, education innovation, e-health, legal framework, tech infrastructure
• http://www.ist-africa.org/home/default.asp?page=doc-by-id&docid=2890
• http://ifap-is-observatory.ittk.hu/node/421

Cameroon:

• National: 2006-?, a ten-pronged plan that took a full 6 years to develop and submit to the government
• http://www.uneca.org/AISI/nici/Cameroon/cameroon.htm

Central African Republic:

• National: 2006, long-term (2030)
• http://www.observatoiretic.org/documents/show/108

Chad:

• National: 2007, general infrastructure plan
• http://www.uneca.org/AISI/NICI/Chad/Plan%20NICI_Tchad.pdf

Egypt:

• National: 2005-Present, a very elaborate plan focused on infrastructure and governance of ICT networks
• http://www.mcit.gov.eg/ict_sector.aspx

Gambia:

• ICT4D 2020 Plan approved in 2008 as part of larger Vision 2020 initiative
• NICI plan had been adopted in 2004
• http://africa.gm/africa/gambia/banjul/article/2008/9/1/gambia-nici-implementation-plan-adopted

Ghana:

• National: 2005-Present
• http://www.ict.gov.gh/

Kenya:

• Kenya ICT Board
• Kenya ICT Action Network
• http://www.ict.go.ke/
• http://www.kictanet.or.ke/

Liberia:

• Draft policy, 2007-2008.
• http://allafrica.com/stories/200809290985.html

Malawi:

• National: 2009 (final draft)
• http://www.malawi.gov.mw/ict_policy.pdf

Mauritania:

• National: Process started in 1999, completed in 2000 with an end date of 2002
• Goals were e-governance and the democratization of ICT
• Ministry devoted to promotion of ICT continues on
• http://www.uneca.org/AISI/NICI/Documents/Mauritanie_NICI_PLan.html

Mauritius:

• National: 2007-2011, goal is to make the ICT sector a main pillar of the economy
• http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/telcomit/?content_id=bdcf551cf8b86110VgnVCM1000000a04a8c0RCRD

Morocco:

• National: 2006-2012, original plan from 1999-2005
• Encourages education, governance, private sector development, e-commerce and access
• http://www.apebi.org.ma/apebi_eng.php?id_article=536&id_rubrique=37

Nigeria:

• National draft: 2012
• Aims to fully integrate information and communications technology into the socio-economic development and transformation of Nigeria into a knowledge based economy
• http://www.commtech.gov.ng/downloads/National_ICT_Policy_DRAFT_090112.pdf

Rwanda:

• National: 2001-2002-2020, four 5-year National Information and Communications Infrastructure Plans, currently in phase three: service deployment
• http://www.rita.gov.rw/laws/nici_plans.html

Senegal:

• Vision: A plan is in the works, but currently Senegal has an ICT vision in place with a goal of 2015
• Document for Accelerated Growth Strategy devised in 2007 with 10 digital projects
• http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cpsi/unpan042130.pdf

Seychelles:

• National: 2007
• http://www.ict.gov.sc/resources/policy.pdf

Sierra Leone:

• Advisory body launched: 2011
• http://news.sl/drwebsite/publish/article_200517080.shtml

South Africa:

• Various ministries, plans, and initiatives have existed since 1996
• A 2015 ICT Vision is in place
• http://www.ist-africa.org/home/default.asp?page=doc-by-id&docid=3576

Swaziland:

• National: 2008 (draft)
• http://www.gov.sz/home.asp?pid=4322

Tunisia:

• A 10-year plan was established in 2005
• The aim is to create an information society
• http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN-OTHER/UNPAN020179.pdf

Uganda:

• National draft, 2008.
• High level dialogue had been on and off from 1997-2000, limited policy in 2003, final report in 2006
• http://www.observatoiretic.org/documents/show/356

Zimbabwe:

• National: 2010-2014 (waiting for approval), plan would promote research and development of ICT, infrastructure, education, cyber security
• http://www.africa-investor.com/article.asp?id=6439

Download an export of national ICT plans by nation from the ICT Observatory. XLS

For the “why and how” of NICI, read this article from UNECA, written in 1999.

National ICT policies as of the year 2000 {UNECA}

Still, inclusion on the watch list does not mean a nation allows unfiltered Internet access to its people. Egypt and Tunisia, both stalwart “enemies of the Internet” have recently seen the overthrow of a regime, but must still eliminate the possibility for future censorship. Including Internet access as a constitutional right would be a great next-step for these nations. In addition, both Egypt and Tunisia need to remove the technical capabilities of Internet filtering. Libya, off the list since 2005, has returned to the “under surveillance” category as the nation enters a period of civil war and near-complete Internet blackouts. If the RSF list were made current, Libya would undoubtedly rank as one of the worst Internet censors in history. Eritrea continues to operate under a dictatorship that is fearful of following in the footsteps of its North African neighbors. In all likelihood Eritrea will again make the dubious “under-surveillance” list in 2012. Steps to free the Internet would mean a combination of 1) a new regime 2) privatization of the telecoms industry 3) shift away from cyber café access. Finally, although not on an RSF list for two years, Zimbabwe’s ruling party continues to intimidate opposition by using the Internet and should be carefully watched.

Nations in purple filter, monitor, and/or limit Internet access

Reporters Without Borders provides the reasoning behind their assessment of Internet censorship. Below are the methods of how each African nation on the list has censored its Internet.

2005:

15 enemies (2 African):

Libya:

• Nearly 1 million people online (one-sixth of the population)
• Internet filters installed by the regime
• Prison sentencing for cyber-dissidents

Tunisia:

• Ben Ali’s family has Internet monopoly within country
• Widespread filtering of online opposition and news sites
• Discourages use of webmail vs. email clients
• Prison sentencing for cyber-dissidents
• Hosted ITU WSIS in November 2005

10 countries to watch (2 African):

Egypt:

• Minor censorship of Internet since 2001
• Surge in blogging appears to trouble government

Zimbabwe:

• Government rumored to have plans to spy on Internet using Chinese technology

2006:

13 enemies (2 African):

Egypt (downgraded from 2005):

• Little online filtering
• Extreme pressure against pro-democracy blogs
• New ruling allows authorities to shut-down websites that pose a threat to national security

Tunisia:

• Internet cafés are state-controlled
• Enforce self-censorship of opposition editors

Removed from enemies list:

Libya:

• Internet is no longer censored
• No cyber arrests since March 2006

2008:

15 enemies (4 African):

• Egypt
• Ethiopia
• Tunisia
• Zimbabwe

2009:

12 enemies (2 African):

Egypt:

• 12.9% Internet penetration, but ADSL users doubled year-over-year
• Cyber cafés monitored by government
• Personal data required to access WiFi networks
• Social networks “taking on the role of trade unions”
• Multiple cyber-dissidents in jail

Tunisia:

• Cyber cafés continue to be monitored
• Extreme web filtering in place
• Multiple cyber attacks on news sites
• Human rights activists face difficulties in accessing email

10 countries under surveillance (2 African):

Eritrea:

• 42 cybercafés
• EriTel owns all network infrastructure and limit services like Skype
• Government attempts to block expatriate sites

Zimbabwe:

• Government meddles with Internet during election periods
• State can intercept email communications

2010:

12 enemies (2 African):

Egypt:

• Nearly 17 million Internet users
• Blogs emerge as effective tools for mass mobilization
• Government is increasingly involved in anti-netizen efforts

Tunisia:

• Widespread Internet adoption but increasing censorship
• Facebook blocked in August 2008, but President’s page has 120,000 fans
• Blocked sites display 404 error rather than 403 error

11 countries under surveillance (1 African):

Eritrea:

• Continued intimidation of Internet users
• Uses two official sites for propaganda
• Two ISPs block critical sites and YouTube

2011:

10 enemies (0 African):

16 countries under surveillance (4 African):

Egypt:

• Heavy filtering and Internet blockage during end of Mubarak’s rule
• Increase in citizen participation in politics is positive
• Mubarak’s online surveillance system is still not entirely dismantled

Eritrea:

• Government is ready to shut-down national Internet at any sign of unrest
• Continued intimidation

Libya:

• Regime attempts to prevent access to civil war news and wants to disrupt opposition while using Web for its own propaganda

Tunisia:

• Sites are no longer blocked and the interior ministry is working with the public to encourage Internet usage
• Censorship technology still remains
• Constitution needs Internet as a basic right, ISP market should be opened

Sources: RSF – 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011

Southern Sudan, bordered by Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, DRC, CAR. {By Mandavi, GFDL via Wikimedia Commons}

Last April, in a city profile on Khartoum‘s information communication technology progress, I speculated:

…a new hurdle could shift attention away from ICT yet again. Southern Sudan’s independence referendum in slated for January 2011.

Well, that day has finally arrived. Results won’t be in for some time, and, given a majority vote for independence, the south will not become sovereign for months. Still, the results of the election almost don’t matter for ICT – southern Sudan, notably Juba, is already separated from Khartoum in terms of ICT activity.

Politically and culturally the separation of the two areas (which perhaps never should have been one country) makes sense. However, from an ICT perspective, the split poses more challenges to the South than it does the North. North Sudan’s ICT scene will most likely remain less affected by southern independence, since much of the infrastructure, Arab investment ties, and whatever ICT policy that exist are located there. The question will be how much of the current policy, precedent, and practice the South chooses, or is able to inherit. Additionally, the logistics surrounding the establishment of sovereignty will understandably overshadow the government’s attention devoted to encouraging the adoption of technology.

In the long term, if political stability can persevere, greater cohesion and unity within each nation should spur ICT growth. Furthermore, neighboring nations (Sudan currently borders an astonishingly high eight other nations) have been encouraged to aid in South Sudan’s assumed transition.

Even if peace endures, minor logistics remain before South Sudan can reach its full growth potential for ICT:

• new ccTLD needed – the .sd country-level domain will presumably apply only to the North
• Sudan Internet Society is based in the North
• a national ICT policy will need to be created (the North could use a new one as well)
• oil revenue sharing and the division of North/South share of foreign debt will influence the financial side
• University of Khartoum leads the way in terms of setting precedents for infrastructure and training in Sudan – what school in the South can fill this void? Or, can Khartoum work with the South?
• Presumably, Sudatel will remain the major telecom operator in the country, but will others use this moment to enter the marketplace?

Web searches suggest that South Sudan has neither sought nor experienced much in the way of ICT projects (mainly due to the disruption of the war). The lack of information is frustrating:

• southern Sudan has reached out to investors and is setting up an ICT forum. This part of the country is ready to provide friendly legislation to ease the inflow of ICT investment.
• However, even in southern Sudan, a World Bank project failed after experiencing a lack of enthusiasm from within. http://www.un-gaid.org/News/tabid/864/mctl/ArticleView/ModuleId/2247/articleId/21358/Sudan-Is-ICT-all-its-cracked-up-to-be.aspx
• In 2006 South Sudan sought Rwanda as a source for ICT expertise. http://allafrica.com/stories/200610150117.html
• South Sudans President Salva Kiir has no official Facebook page, but over 267 people like an unofficial page. A Wikipedia community page is liked by over 500 individuals.

Again, South Sudan is in good geographic position: the nation borders North, East, and Central Africa. Neighboring Uganda is quite advanced in ICT for a nation of its size and the capital of Kampala is located not far from Juba. Juba, with an estimated population of 250,000 and once a transportation hub, is already home to extensions of Kenyan and Ugandan business. It will be this city that must lead the new country.